Close your eyes for a moment and imagine The country with more robots in its factories. The logical thing would be to think of Japan, and not a few would also include the United States in the quiniela. However, the most recent figures point out another destination and do it clearly: China, where robotics has ceased to be an experiment to become the daily pulse of production. It should be specified from the start: we do not talk about showcase humanoids, but of industrial welding robots, manipulation, and assembly, which are transforming manufacturing speeds.
The last report from the International Robotics Federation offers the clearest photograph of this phenomenon. In 2024 alone, Chinese factories installed about 300,000 industrial robots, a figure higher than the rest of the combined world. In parallel, the total park exceeded two million active units, well above any competitor. In contrast, the United States added 34,000 new robots in its production lines and Japan around 44,000, confirming the magnitude of the Chinese leap.
China Not Only Competes, Already Dominates
China’s hegemony in industrial robotics has not appeared out of nowhere. Since 2017, its factories have installed between 145,000 and 295,000 annual robots, with an especially strong jump from 2021. The pandemic barely slowed that progression, and in 2024 the figure was again located around 300,000 units. In contrast, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Germany not only started from much more modest volumes, but also registered declines in the last statistics.
The next step in the Chinese strategy was not only to install robots, but to manufacture them on a large scale. For the first time, Chinese suppliers sold more than foreigners in their own market: 57% of the 2024 installations were of local origin. On a global scale, Japan remains the main manufacturing country, accounting for around 38% of the world supply, according to IFR. This turn reduces dependence, although it does not equal full technological autonomy.
Chinese industrial policy has been decisive in accelerating the transition to automation. The initiative Made in China 2025 marked the first great milestone in 2015, with the aim of reducing dependence on imports in key sectors. Six years later, in 2021, the country adopted a specific plan to multiply the deployment of industrial robots. This planning included low-interest loans from state banks and support for technological purchases abroad. The result has been fertile terrain for the expansion of Chinese robotics.
When discussing robotics, the most common image is that of humanoids like Optimus or other advanced figures. However, the figures that place China in the lead correspond only to industrial robots: mechanical arms that weld, assemble, or move materials on the production line. The report intentionally excludes humanoid robots, which remain in an experimental phase with minimal sales. Even so, state initiatives have generated an ecosystem of humanoid-focused Chinese startups, such as Unitree, although their weight in the industry remains marginal.
The figures that place China in the lead correspond only to industrial robots.
The integration of artificial intelligence into the factory is not exclusive to China; Japan, South Korea, Germany, and the United States also apply vision systems for automated failures and quality control algorithms. However, what distinguishes Beijing is the scale at which this practice has spread, making it a usual component of its industrial strategy. In many plants, AI monitors machines in real-time, anticipates breakdowns, and adjusts processes accordingly. This broader and more coordinated deployment has greatly multiplied the impact of automation.
The technological leap also depends heavily on the specialized workforce that enables it. China boasts a large number of skilled technicians, from programmers to industrial electricians, capable of installing and maintaining robots in complex environments. However, the report warns that demand exceeds supply, and salaries for these installers have surged, reaching around $60,000 annually. This talent gap reflects a global bottleneck: automation does not advance solely with capital and machines; it needs professionals to integrate it into the fabric of the factory.
Although China has achieved leadership in industrial robotics, its dominance has clear borders. While the country already manufactures a third of the world’s robots, it still relies on foreign suppliers for some critical components. High-precision sensors and advanced semiconductors, for example, remain the domain of Japan and Germany, who enjoy decades of technological advantage. This deficit limits China’s ability to assemble higher-range robots, particularly humanoids. Even with a thriving ecosystem, complete technological autonomy is not yet a reality and marks one of Beijing’s pressing challenges.
While China remains dependent on foreign suppliers, the weight of its market already affects global dynamics. By producing and installing more robots than any other country, it achieves economies of scale that reduce automation project costs and exert downward pressure on international prices. The sheer volume of China’s robotics market enables it to influence technical standards and improve equipment interoperability. In the supply chain, the center of gravity is shifting to Asia, requiring other countries to adapt to a framework where China sets the pace, even if it does not yet control all technology.
The map of industrial robotics is no longer comprehensible without China at its center. Over the next two years, attention will focus on whether China can reduce its dependence on key components and sustain the remarkable pace of 300,000 new installations annually. Beijing has expressed intentions to extend this model to emerging sectors like humanoids and reinforce its role in global supply chains. For the rest of the world, the question has shifted from whether China will continue to lead in volume to how to respond to a strategy that interweaves scale, industrial policy, and technological ambition.
Images | Simon Kadula | Arthur Wang