After the dam at the Braskereidfoss power plant burst during the extreme storm “Hans”, Hafslund Eco ordered an investigation into the incident. The conclusion is now clear: Hafslund Eco did not have good enough routines and systems to handle such an extraordinary situation as “Hans” caused. They were not aware enough of the dangers of rising water levels. – We take this very seriously and have taken measures, says managing director Kristin Lian in a press release. The power plant is unmanned and controlled from the operations center in Lillehammer. There, several alarms were received about rising water levels during the night, but the operators were not aware of it, says a report from DNV. The reasons: Was on site, but left The power plant is unmanned, and is normally monitored and controlled from the operations center in Lillehammer. Several alarms at the operations center warned of rising water levels during the night. The operators did not get these, DNV writes in the report. They point to several underlying causes, including: Vulnerability of the power plant: The only thing that can prevent Braskereidfoss from overflowing with high water flows is to open the floodgates. For this to happen, the operator at the operations center must activate the hatches. There is no automatic emergency regulation, or other mechanisms, which are set in motion. Vulnerability in the operations centre: Provisions were not made for staffing the operations center during emergency situations, neither in terms of organisation, physical arrangement or the operational control system. Emergency drills directly aimed at the operations center are not carried out. Extraordinary workload: Under “Hans”, there were several critical situations in other areas which were also handled from the operations centre. The amount of information and number of alarms was very high. This led to a poor overview. Overload on employees: Physical exhaustion of operators at the operations center due to heavy workloads and high stress levels. Didn’t understand the seriousness: Permanent staffing at the power plant itself during the night was not seen as necessary. Operating personnel saw the plant at midnight, then left. Surveillance images from the day itself show how high the water rose. Photo: The report on Braskereidfoss DNV also refers to technical vulnerabilities in the design of the power plant. These were discovered in 1992. Some were remedied, others not. Precisely these weaknesses were not a contributing factor to the floodgates not being opened as normal when the water level rose, according to DNV. But they do not rule out that if the known weaknesses were rectified according to the recommendations from 1992, the extent of the damage could have been limited. Hafslund was not aware enough of the dangers of rising water levels before the dam failure at Braskereidfoss during extreme weather Hans, a report shows. Photo: Lars Erik Skrefsrud / news The measures Among the measures that have all been implemented are: Additional staffing of the operations center in emergency situations Adjusted limit for water flow level for staffing the power plant Expanded monitoring function in the event of a major flood Improved overview of facilities that are particularly exposed in the event of a major flood Because others can also learning from the incident, Hafslund Eco publishes the report, says the press release. – We made mistakes which led to the floodgates not being opened. The report points to several reasons why this could happen. We were not sufficiently prepared for such a demanding situation and our contingency plans made us too dependent on the operations center functioning optimally, even under extreme load, says managing director Kristin Lian.
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DNV’s investigation of the incident at Braskereidfoss – news Innlandet – Local news, TV and radio
