According to Reuters<\/a>, this air reinforcement includes the deployment of an \u00a0American aircraft carrier\u00a0, showcasing a comprehensive combat capacity. While Secretary of Defense \u00a0Pete Hegseth\u00a0 has emphasized that this deployment serves strictly \u00a0defensive purposes\u00a0, U.S. military sources confirm that these platforms have already been utilized to intercept drones and missiles launched by Iran in response to Israeli attacks.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Reactions in Spain<\/strong>. The use of Spanish military facilities by the United States has raised \u00a0concerns\u00a0 within the Spanish parliamentary framework. The political party \u00a0Podemos\u00a0 has lodged a series of inquiries in Congress, seeking explanations for the arrival of the tanker aircraft at \u00a0Mor\u00f3n\u00a0. Their letter expresses suspicions regarding the facilities being used as logistical stops to support military operations for Israel.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
Podemos has also questioned whether the Spanish government was aware of these movements and whether it monitors their purpose. This raises ongoing debates about \u00a0operational sovereignty\u00a0 and Spain’s indirect involvement in a high-intensity international conflict.<\/p>\n
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An Eurofighter Typhoon from Ala 11 in Mor\u00f3n in 2015<\/span>\n <\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\nLegal Basis and Precedents<\/strong>. The current utilization of Rota and Mor\u00f3n bases by the U.S. falls under a strategic relationship that began in \u00a01953\u00a0 when Spain, then under the Franco dictatorship, signed the so-called \u00a0Madrid Agreements\u00a0. In exchange for military and economic assistance, the installation of American bases on Spanish territory was authorized. This initial network included bases in \u00a0Zaragoza\u00a0, \u00a0Torrej\u00f3n de Ardoz\u00a0, \u00a0Mor\u00f3n\u00a0, and \u00a0Rota\u00a0, marking Spain’s first steps toward integration with \u00a0NATO\u00a0, which wouldn’t fully materialize until 1982.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The current legal framework for the shared use of Rota and Mor\u00f3n was established through the \u00a0Cooperation Agreement for Defense\u00a0 signed on December 1, 1988, between the governments of \u00a0Felipe Gonz\u00e1lez\u00a0 and \u00a0Ronald Reagan\u00a0 amid the final stages of the Cold War. This treaty has been amended three times to adapt to evolving \u00a0geostrategic\u00a0 and operational requirements.<\/p>\n
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According to the \u00a0Ministry of Defense\u00a0, the second amendment protocol fixed a validity period of \u00a0eight years\u00a0, expiring on May 22, 2021. However, an automatic yearly extension provision exists, allowing for continued collaboration unless one party expresses otherwise six months in advance. This process has continued, albeit with some exceptions.<\/p>\n
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Operational Limitations<\/strong>. While American jurisdiction applies in certain areas within the bases, Spain retains \u00a0sovereignty\u00a0 and political control over their strategic use. The U.S. cannot utilize these facilities unilaterally and must seek explicit permission from the Spanish government, as stipulated in the agreement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
This principle remains intact, but it hasn’t created obstacles in previous military actions, such as during the \u00a0Iraq\u00a0 and \u00a0Afghanistan\u00a0 wars, where Spanish governments authorized unrestricted U.S. use of the bases. In 2021, Spain also allowed both bases to temporarily host Afghan collaborators during their evacuation from \u00a0Kabul\u00a0.<\/p>\n
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Military Presence<\/strong>. Under the treaty, the U.S. can maintain up to \u00a02,200 military personnel\u00a0, \u00a036 aircraft\u00a0, and \u00a0500 civilians\u00a0 at Mor\u00f3n, though the current contingent is closer to \u00a0600 personnel\u00a0. In Rota, the allowed limit is \u00a04,250 military\u00a0 and \u00a01,000 U.S. civilians\u00a0.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
These figures indicate a gradual reduction compared to previous decades. In 2023, plans were confirmed to move the \u00a0rapid response force for Africa\u00a0 from Mor\u00f3n to a base in *Italy*, highlighting operational retreats that directly impact the \u00a0employment\u00a0 and \u00a0economies\u00a0 of surrounding areas, which receive about \u00a0two million euros\u00a0 annually from the U.S. presence.<\/p>\n
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Potential for Veto<\/strong>. To the pressing question: Could Spain deny the use of its air bases regarding the \u00a0Israel-Iran conflict\u00a0? The short answer is yes. Historical precedents exist, such as the return of \u00a0Torrej\u00f3n\u00a0 in 1991 and \u00a0Zaragoza\u00a0 in 1992. Moreover, in 1986, \u00a0Felipe Gonz\u00e1lez’s\u00a0 government announced it would not automatically renew the treaty and demanded the withdrawal of U.S. F-16s from Torrej\u00f3n, leading to their ultimate removal.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Hence, the lack of automatic renewal implies that the U.S. must vacate the premises if the Spanish government deems it necessary, a legal right proven throughout Spain’s history with \u00a0NATO\u00a0 and U.S. agreements. This flexibility grants Spain the legal authority to deny specific operations involving \u00a0Mor\u00f3n or Rota\u00a0 for refueling or supportive air missions.<\/p>\n
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