This is revealed in the recent report from the 25 June committee. Already on 20 June, PST received a notification that Arfan Bhatti was probably involved in a possible terrorist attack in Norway, but PST never checked who could be a possible perpetrator of the attack. This despite the fact that they were concerned about the relationship he had with Zaniar Matapour. He is now charged with two counts of murder and terror after the shooting on 25 June last year. The attack could have been prevented if the PST had focused more on Matapour, is one of the conclusions of the report being presented today. City councilor Raymond Johansen tells news that the findings in the report are “completely crushing and completely unacceptable”. Live broadcast starts at 11.30: The key findings The nearly 300-page investigative report has examined what, among other things, PST and the police knew in advance of the attack. The evaluation has ten key findings. Several of the findings conclude that the attack could have been prevented. The committee has found four clues that, in theory, could have helped to prevent the attack, including: PST’s long-term prevention The committee believes that PST should have opened a preventive case after Arfan Bhatti and Zaniar Matapour were stopped by the police at the end of April 2022. The two had followed a car with two SIAN members and had two knives in the car. PST believed that Matapour had a very high capacity for violence and that he was vulnerable to influence from Bhatti and his entourage. There was also a lot of contact between Bhatti and Matapour in the time before the attack. DEMONSTRATION: Arfan Bhatti holds an appeal during a demonstration outside the Storting against Norway’s participation in the war in Afghanistan in 2012. Photo: Håkon Mosvold Larsen / NTB In the report it appears that Matapour ended up in the PST’s spotlight for the first time in 2016. They relied on information about that he must have been radicalized in 2015, the report states. The PST assessed that he was vulnerable to radicalisation, and in 2019 he was designated as a possible “perpetrator of an attack”. The committee considers it possible that the attack could have been averted if the PST had opened a preventive case against Matapour in April 2022. The committee believes that the PST initially worked well with the alert, but that the counter-terrorism department did not treat the alert as equally time-critical. The committee has noted that there is internal disagreement in PST related to how serious the warning was. Some in the service thought the warning did not appear more serious than the many other tips and notifications PST receives, while others thought the warning stood out. The reason for this was that it is unusual for the E-service to write such notifications, and that the E-service considered the information to be credible. Oslo terror 25 June 2022 Photo: Synnøve Sundby Fallmyr / news Two men were killed and 23 people injured in nightclubs in the center of Oslo on 25 June 2022. Zaniar Matapour (43) is charged with murder, attempted murder and acts of terrorism. Islamist Arfan Bhatti and two other men are charged with complicity in the attack, which is considered serious terrorism. Follow the thread. Afterwards, the street where the terror took place, between the Thon Hotel Rosenkrantz and the London Pub, was painted in rainbow colors and declared car-free. Several believe the attack could have been avoided if the security services had done a better job. Afterwards, several pride events were canceled for fear of more attacks. In 2023, more people are expected in the pride marking, especially in Oslo, than ever before. Read all the articles about the pride shooting here. As of 31 May 2023. The committee believes that PST’s work with the notice was rather one-sided. The PST focused on finding out whether the person who wanted to contact IS was really Bhatti, rather than trying to find out who could actually carry out the attack, as Bhatti himself was in Pakistan. “In other words, no one in PST tried to answer who could be a possible perpetrator of an attack in Norway if Bhatti was actually involved, considering that he himself was abroad.” The committee believes there is a high probability that PST would have identified Matapour as a possible perpetrator of an attack. The Facebook post with the burning pride flag On 14 June, Arfan Bhatti posted a burning rainbow flag and a text justifying the killing of homosexuals. When PST was notified by the E-service on the Monday before the attack, PST did not check Bhatti’s social media profiles. The committee considers that PST should have uncovered Bhatti’s Facebook post as part of its work with the warning from the E-service in the days leading up to the attack, and on the basis of that notified the Oslo police district of a possible imminent terrorist attack where pride events and/or – participants were a possible target group. The ten most central findings It is possible that the attack on the night of 25 June 2022 could have been prevented if PST had opened a preventive case against Zaniar Matapour in the months leading up to the attack. Although PST relied on relevant self-produced intelligence about Matapour, PST did not share this intelligence with the radicalization contacts in the police who were responsible for following him up. It is possible that the attack could have been averted as a result of a notification PST received from the E-service five days before the attack occurred. No one in PST ever checked Bhatti’s social media accounts as a result of the notice from the E-service. The police’s operational handling of the attack, including implementation of the procedure for ongoing life-threatening violence (PLIVO), notification and interaction internally and externally, was on the whole well carried out and in line with current guidelines and procedures. Lack of preparedness/availability for important functions in the Oslo police district still constitutes a limitation for the police’s abilities and opportunities to handle serious crises and incidents. The police authorities entrusted too much communication responsibility to Oslo Pride. There was too little interaction between Oslo police district, PST and the Norwegian Police Directorate about how they should communicate about the attack. The director of police did not have sufficient grounds to review the Oslo police district’s operational assessments of whether the solidarity marking on 27 June could be carried out. The decision to recommend the cancellation of the solidarity marking was in violation of the freedom of assembly according to Section 101 of the Constitution and Article 11 of the ECHR. The committee asks whether PST has kept a cool head The committee also points to a specific department in PST, which worked to investigate the notification from the E-service . The committee believes that the counter-terrorism department in PST has developed a culture where keeping a cool head and not overreacting to new threat information is valued. The committee asks whether the department kept a cooler head than necessary when they received the notification from the E-service. The committee believes this may have contributed to the department not realizing that there was an element of urgency linked to the warning from the E-service about possible terror in Norway, according to what news understands. The report states that the first line in PST perceived that the matter was urgent, while the counter-terrorism department did not perceive it to the same extent. According to some in PST itself, this would obviously change if the E-service had informed about the E-service’s collection operation which was behind the notice, which the E-service did not do. The report also states that parts of the counter-terrorism department showed skepticism about the information and assessments of the E-service. The committee believes that it can be linked to a desire to be the best in one’s field, i.e. better than the E-service. Some people in PST who were involved in the handling have told the committee that the E-service may have a tendency to exaggerate the importance of received information. Ba Matapour at lunch during Lent The committee believes that PST has also not paid enough attention to events and events of special importance for minority groups in civil society. One example the committee highlights is that PST the day before Ramadan asked if Matapour wanted to meet for lunch one day during the fast. Muslims do not eat between sunrise and sunset during Ramadan. The committee believes that it appears somewhat inconsiderate to invite an extreme Islamist to lunch during Lent, when one was trying to build trust in Matapour. The committee also says that PST was not sufficiently aware that the pride celebration was taking place when the E-service told that Bhatti had posted a burning rainbow flag: While those in PST who worked with the far right were aware of this, the committee says that PST probably did not consider that queer formed such a central part of the threat picture of extreme Islamists that they would carry out an attack against them. The committee writes that it has long been known to PST, researchers and the journalist that queer people are part of the image of the enemy of extreme Islamists: “Therefore, the committee believes that PST’s lack of attention to the ongoing pride marking when they were made aware of Bhatti’s Facebook post, is reprehensible.” The entire report can be read here.
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Tried not to find possible perpetrator – news Norway – Overview of news from various parts of the country
