It has been over four years. One of the most talked about ship closures ever will get a new period. Over the course of 30 days, the Hordaland district court will hear why a 33-year-old man, with eight months’ experience as a watch commander, can be punished for the collision between KNM “Helge Ingstad” and “Sola TS”. They will also hear for the first time how the watch commander himself experienced the dramatic minutes in the Hjeltefjorden, including the loss of one of the Defence’s most important ships. Surveillance camera on “Sola TS” Night of 8 November 2018, at 04:01:15. The Norwegian Navy’s frigate KNM “Helge Ingstad” collides with the fully loaded oil tanker “Sola TS”. Graphic: Accident Investigation Board The frigate suffered a huge gash in the hull. Almost pure coincidence meant that none of the 137 people on board the frigate perished. – A number of young people were about to lose their lives that night. That says something about the seriousness of the case, which may not have come out clearly enough earlier, says state attorney Magne Kvamme Sylta. The court case is the last chapter in the aftermath of what happened in Hjeltefjorden. – He admits that he has a responsibility and that he made a misjudgment. But not to the extent that he can be punished for it. He has been hung out as a scapegoat for a system that has failed, says defender Christian Lundin. 21 decisive minutes in Hjeltefjorden The Norwegian Public Prosecutor’s Office has brought charges against the watch commander because he was responsible for the navigation of the ship when the collision occurred. They believe that the navigation was careless and that the lack of overview and the stuck understanding of the situation was “the clearly dominant cause of the collision”. § 356 of the Penal Code, cf. § 355 for negligently causing marine damage, which could easily result in the loss of human life. Negligently causing danger to the public is punishable by a fine or imprisonment for up to 3 years. Military Penal Code § 78 first paragraph and third paragraph for as a commanding officer to have been guilty of negligence or carelessness in the performance of their official duties, and significant damage has been caused, […].«If significant damage has been caused by the commander’s negligence, carelessness or lack of understanding, imprisonment for up to 2 years can be applied, […]». The drama happened in a very short space of time on the night of 8 November 2018. KNM “Helge Ingstad”, which had taken part in the NATO exercise “Trident Juncture”, came south in the Hjeltefjorden at a speed of 17–18 knots. At 03.40, 21 minutes before the collision, the incoming watch commander arrived on the bridge. According to the Accident Investigation Board, he first went into the chart room to check the position and sailing route. There are essentially three misjudgments that have led to charges being brought against the 33-year-old: Discussed “luminous object” – don’t check it Graphic: National Accident Investigation Board At 03.45. The tanker “Sola TS” left the quay at the Sture terminal. Graphic: Accident Investigation Board The tanker reported on the radio to Fedje maritime traffic center that it had departed from the Sture terminal. Further north in the Hjeltefjord, KNM “Helge Ingstad” arrived. Graphic: Accident Investigation Board At the same time, the change of guard and the handover on KNM “Helge Ingstad” were underway. Graphic: Accident Investigation Board Outgoing and incoming duty chiefs discussed what an illuminated object at the Sture terminal could be. They discussed whether it could be the quay at the terminal, or a fish farming facility or a platform. Video: Norwegian Accident Investigation Board To the Norwegian Accident Investigation Board, the two watch chiefs explained that the “object” sent out a signal and was on the radar. But they did not clarify what it was. This video from the reconstruction shows the view from the bridge of the frigate. Vaktsjefane interpreted the light to the left as being at rest on land. The state prosecutors believe the 33-year-old: did not investigate well enough whether the object was stationary or was a vessel on land. did not use the aids he had available, such as using the radar to examine the signal from the object to see if it was moving. did not ask the others on the bridge to find out more about the object. did not realize that the tanker announced its departure from Stureterminalen on the radio to the Maritime Traffic Center at 03.45. KNM “Helge Ingstad” is designed for war. The ship is fast and should be able to easily change course or stop completely. The tanker “Sola TS” is large and solid, built to transport the cargo safely. The ship is very heavy to manoeuvre. On the night of the accident, she was fully loaded with 625,000 barrels of crude oil. The contrast is enormous. It is 140,000 tonnes against 5,000 tonnes. Changing course KNM “Helge Ingstad” followed a planned course. They sailed with their radar transmitter switched off, but thus received signals from others (AIS system in passive mode). There were four men and three women on the bridge, several of them only 19–20 years old. Two people were being trained as a duty officer and the duty officer’s assistant. The average age was 22.4 years. This was the crew on the bridge when the collision occurred Photo: Accident Investigation Board The others on the bridge have all been called in as witnesses in the trial in Hordaland district court. In addition, the outgoing warden must also testify. Duty manager: Male (33). Was 29 years old and was approved as a guard just eight months before the collision. Graduated from the Naval Academy and was approved as watch commander after three quarters of a year in training at “Helge Ingstad”. Warden in training: Woman (born in 1989). American officer, who sailed the ship while the watch commander was responsible for navigation and training. Had worked on Norwegian frigates since 2017 and gathered experience in navigation. On the night of the accident, she had been on the bridge since 02.18. The warden’s assistant: Woman (24). Was 20 years old when the collision occurred. Had started as an apprentice sailor in the Navy after first service and had been on board the frigate for 14 months. The warden’s assistant in training: Male (23). Was 19 years old when the collision occurred. In first service and was a sailor’s apprentice. Mønstra on board around 14 days before the collision. Starboard lookout: Female (24). Was 20 years old the night of the collision. In the first service. Started on duty at 02.00 and first spent an hour as port lookout, then helmsman. Went to eat dinner at 03.51 and returned at 03.59 and took over as starboard lookout. Port lookout: Man (24). Was 20 years old when the collision happened. Also in the first service and muster on board the frigate eight months before the collision. Helmsman: Male (24). Was 20 years old when the collision happened. In first service and enlisted on board the frigate four months before the accident. Took over as helmsman at 03.48. He perceived earlier than the others that the “luminous object” was a vessel in motion, but assumed that both the watch commander and the watch commander’s assistant were aware of this. Just before the collision, he also realized that they were on a collision course and stood up to be ready to carry out helm orders. The outgoing watch commander is a man (34) who had been a navigator on several frigates for the Norwegian Navy and had a civilian education in nautical. Had also been on board the Skjold class for three years, as well as sailing on civilian vessels along the Norwegian coast for one year. He had the responsibility as watch commander on the frigate on watch that ran from midnight to 04:00 on the night of the accident, but had therefore handed over responsibility to the incoming watch commander at 03:53. Source: Norwegian Accident Investigation Board’s partial report 1. Graphic: Norwegian Accident Investigation Board At 03.53 the handover was over. The now accused watch commander loudly told everyone on the bridge that he had now taken over. Graphic: Norwegian Accident Investigation Board At 03:57:25 the distance between the tanker and the frigate was approximately 2720 metres. Graphic : Accident Investigation Board On the tanker they could now see the green lantern on the frigate. Graphics: Accident Investigation Board And that the vessel would cross their course. The pilot on “Sola TS” asked the maritime traffic center over the radio if they knew who was coming towards them. The traffic operator could not give an answer. At 03:59:10 the tanker steered a few degrees to starboard, to show the oncoming vessel that they were giving way. But a few seconds later, the commander of the watch on the frigate made a course change that did not improve the situation. He walked a few degrees to port, i.e. in the same direction as the tanker. He wanted to be more aware of the luminous object he thought was resting on land. The public prosecutors believe that the commander of the watch did not investigate why it was necessary to change course in the port direction. Did not make an evasive maneuver in time At the sea traffic centre, the traffic operator suddenly realized that the crew of the KNM “Helge Ingstad” had actually reported their arrival in the Hjeltefjord earlier in the night. At 03:59:40 he called up “Sola TS” on the radio and said that “it’s possible it’s “Helge Ingstad””. The pilot called up the frigate immediately afterwards. Now the distance between the ships was only 875 metres. Pilot: – Helge Ingstad, can you hear Sola TS? Watch chief: – Helge Ingstad. Watch chief: – Are you the one coming here? are we going too close to the e… blocks/lights. The pilot: – Turn to starboard if you are the one coming here. The watch chief: – I… a couple of degrees to starboard over as soon as we have passed e…, passed e….. the platform we have on starboard. In the indictment, the state attorney writes that the watch commander “was asked to turn to starboard immediately, but did not take measures to prevent danger and damage, such as reducing speed and clarifying from whom and why he was asked to turn to starboard, in order to thereby be able to make a adequate evasion”. At 04:00:27 the watch commander thought it was one of the other three northbound vessels in the Hjeltefjord that he was talking to. And that they wanted him to take more starboard, to give more space. His understanding was still that the luminous object was at rest close to land and that there was therefore no room for it to pass to starboard. Collision And then, at 04:00:47, the duty manager realized that the “platform” was actually moving. And that they were on a crash course. The Norwegian Accident Investigation Board has recreated the dramatic half-minute: THE COLLISION: The graphics from the Norwegian Accident Investigation Board and the surveillance camera on “Sola TS” show what the collision between the two ships was like. The video is without sound. When the watch commander discovered the danger of collision, he asked the helmsman for 20 degrees to port, before almost immediately afterwards he asked for a course amidships. The idea was to avoid the collision by twisting around the bow of the tanker. But then it was too late. At 04:01:15 KNM “Helge Ingstad” and “Sola TS” collided. After the collision, the crew lost control of the frigate. After ten minutes it went ashore north of Stureterminalen. The 137 on board evacuated before the frigate was later capsized. Photo: Terje Pedersen / NTB When was it too late? A powerful maneuver in which the watch commander went hard to starboard could have prevented the collision. But then it had to have been carried out no later than 04:00:37. It was the “point of no return”. “Point of no return” At 04:00:37 the vessels were 375 meters from each other and it was: 38 seconds until the collision occurred .10 seconds before the watch commander actually discovered that “the shining object” was a vessel in motion. The maneuver would have given a passing distance of barely 0-25 metres. Will speak for the first time – It is a personal responsibility to be a watch commander on the bridge of a frigate. When you go on duty, you have a responsibility to familiarize yourself with and have an overview of the situation in front of you, says prosecutor Magne Kvamme Sylta. The criminal case against the 33-year-old accused will go before Hordaland district court for eight weeks. There are a full five days until his statement, which begins on Wednesday 18 January. It will be the first time the warden speaks directly to the public about his version of what happened that fateful night. His defender, Christian Lundin, says the trial will put the role of the warden in a completely new light. – Although he hates the process, he is looking forward to getting his version of what happened. For Lundin and the watch commander will use the court case to shed light on the situation that arose in Hjeltefjorden and that several people failed that night. Among other things, the Accident Investigation Board points to: the strong deck lights on “Sola TS” which made it difficult to see the lanterns that show they were a vessel. that the pilot on “Sola TS” could have been clearer on the radio that they were a tanker that left Stureterminalen. that the traffic operator had forgotten that the frigate reported its arrival earlier in the night and therefore could not give the tanker an answer over the radio earlier. That made the room for action shorter. The Attorney General dropped the cases against these actors because no criminal charges were proven, even though “some mistakes” were made. – Here there have been significant system errors, also with the tanker and at the traffic centre. The duty manager believes that if you look at the whole course of events in context, you can see that it was a system failure that was the cause of the accident and that the cause lies somewhere completely different from him. Source: Norwegian Accident Investigation Board’s report parts 1 and 2, the Attorney General, interview with state prosecutors and defenders.
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