The reactions to China’s peace initiative on Ukraine have become an almost automatic reflex more than thoughtful policy. It seems that Western politicians and commentators are annoyed that it is China that is promoting such an initiative. But regardless of whether it is serious or a play from Beijing, it is wise to take it seriously. It is true that China “lacks credibility” vis-à-vis the West. But China is the only country that has credibility in Moscow. President Putin cannot ignore Chinese positions. The West should seek to bind China to a policy of peace and to create distance between China and Russia. It requires soundings to clarify what China means. Rejection may lead China to conclude that “we tried but got no support”. At worst, it could lead to a more active pro-Russian line. President Zelensky seems to have understood it better than Western politicians. He wants – like President Macron – to visit Beijing. China is far from wholehearted in its “support” for Russia. Already in September – ahead of a meeting with President Xi – Putin publicly stated that China had “questions and concerns” about the war against Ukraine. And Beijing is concerned about the deteriorating relationship with the United States. The main issues in peace negotiations will be about borders and about Ukraine’s future status. China’s initiative emphasizes that a peace solution must be based on respect for states’ territorial integrity and sovereignty. With China’s traditionally conservative politics, it must be assumed that means within internationally accepted limits. On the issue of future status, China distances itself from the expansion of “military blocs”. It goes against NATO’s “open door” policy. But there has also been disagreement within NATO about how closely Ukraine should be linked to the Alliance. The choice is between membership and a solution that is not membership, but which creates a connection to the west that can be reassuring. Incidentally, China emphasizes the importance of avoiding the use of nuclear weapons – pointing the finger at Russian threats. The question of a ceasefire is of course central. The Chinese initiative is realistic. The ceasefire should come after the parties are in dialogue and a de-escalation of the war is initiated. It should make it more difficult to abuse a ceasefire to strengthen one’s own military positions. Now the OSCE should be tasked with preparing for the monitoring of a future ceasefire. The initiative also includes humanitarian challenges, protection of civilians and prisoners of war, relief in grain exports, as well as reconstruction when the war is over. These are important and self-evident elements. At the same time, China will – not surprisingly – remove the sanctions against Russia, as part of a peace solution. Critics have pointed out that Beijing is using the initiative to attack Western politics. It is language that cannot be incorporated into a peace plan. Rather, it is a response to the massive Western criticism China is now being subjected to. The initiative is not a peace plan, but a compilation of elements. It is common – and wise. The first initiatives are rarely presented as an elaborate peace plan. But there is a need for a starting point, which can eventually lead to negotiations. Perhaps China’s initiative is a play. If so, it is important to clarify it. This also requires soundings. We cannot afford to blow off the initiative. Recently, China has also contributed to an agreement between rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia, which could improve relations between them and, at best, help stop the war in Yemen. A peace process requires several tracks: First and foremost, Ukraine and Russia must negotiate. Secondly, a larger group of countries must discuss issues related to stability in the region. Finally, the OSCE must play a role, in a ceasefire and to discuss long-term issues related to European security. For more than 20 years, the political dialogue between the great powers has been virtually dead. It’s time to get the dialogue going again. The costs of not doing so can be enormous.
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