It does not look good for PST – Ytring

There are still new leaks about what unfolded behind closed doors in the secret services in the days before the terrorist attack. And what we have learned so far is powerful diet. According to news’s ​​information, the National Intelligence Service believed that an attack in Norway was likely. And they believed that the Bhatti community was behind it. Just hours before the shooting, they also found a Facebook profile where Arfan Bhatti incited hatred towards homosexuals, and posted a picture of a burning rainbow flag. All this was passed on to PST. In other words, both Secret Services had both a possible environment and a possible target. Then it is almost incomprehensible why no one pressed the big, red button. Could police patrols be deployed? Because of that, no alarm was raised. As a result, the police districts were not notified either. Among the questions the investigative committee will almost certainly ask themselves is what the Oslo police would do if they found out what the secret services were up to. In Oslo, as recently as May of the same year, Arfan Bhatti had been stopped together with Zaniar Matapour. Would someone in the capital police put two and two together and start their own investigations? Would the operational police force be put on higher alert? Could police patrols be placed at gathering places for queers? Another point is why PST did not themselves start a so-called preventive investigation when they received the information from the E-service. We have previously heard from the PST team that they thought the warning was “naked”. Outgoing deputy chief Hedvig Moe also told VG as recently as April that it is wrong that PST received all the information before the terrorist attack. A central question for the investigative committee is probably whether the security police knew enough to warrant that they should have taken action. Where did it go wrong? PST has a well-stocked toolbox, and can, for example, carry out reconnaissance, telephone tapping, secret searches or control of the accused’s PC. But the tools were not used until after the attack was a fact. So where did it go wrong? And why did it happen that way? It will be interesting to see whether the investigative committee has found answers to these two questions. None of the former PST management work there anymore today, but there is reason to believe that several of them have had to answer for themselves to the committee. PST has been in severe weather before, but there are many indications that the storm is getting stronger now. The security service’s biggest and most important task is to prevent terrorism against targets in Norway. Of course, PST must also investigate and prosecute cases, but the highest priority will always be to prevent something from happening. They don’t seem to have managed that this time.



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