The terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 took Israel to bed. The capabilities that Hamas displayed were known, but no one caught on to what was brewing. The IDF had indications, but there was little concrete. Unsettled questions are whether the prelude to violence for a period in the West Bank was intended to draw the Israeli army’s (IDF) focus away from the south, whether Israel has had too much faith in the deterrent effect, whether Israel has allowed Hamas to build up over too long a period of time, and whether the IDF has relied too much on technological sensors along the border with the Gaza Strip. The answers will come after the war. Bringing Israel together That Hamas’ terrorist attack will be a game changer is as obvious as the intelligence failure. The question is how the development and the end result will be, because all wars have their own dynamics. The response from the Israeli authorities will undoubtedly be brutal. A state’s primary task is to protect its citizens from threats to life and health. The scale and brutality that Hamas has shown leaves no room for anything other than a forceful military response. If an Israeli government thought otherwise, it would not survive the day. Contrary to what some might think after months of political unrest in Israel, it has turned out that the war acts as a superglue that unites all Israelis and Jews, and the emergency government has a wide margin of maneuver. The IDF’s start is predictable The military strategy the IDF is now implementing is partly predictable. The war against Hezbollah in 2006 reminded Israel that war is not won with air forces and artillery alone. Boots on the ground are required. After 2006, the IDF developed a new doctrine, where composite ground forces with different capabilities operate at the front when entering urban areas. The legitimacy Hamas has tried to establish, they themselves shot to shreds with their terrorist attack on Israel, writes researcher Cato Hemmingby. Photo: PHS The command and control element has also been developed. Direct, real-time communication between ground, air and naval combat forces at the tactical level significantly increases combat capability. This was seen both in 2008–2009 and in 2014, when the IDF entered the Gaza Strip. The IDF’s arsenal has also been strengthened. F-35 fighters and a Sylfarian advanced version of the Merkava tank are two examples. Although Hamas has also developed, their military inferiority will become apparent in full-scale war. Initially, Israel emphasized mobilization and the restoration of security in Israel. Furthermore, the IDF has activated air force and artillery against the Gaza Strip, based on the IDF’s already identified targets and supplementary intelligence. The aim is to quickly weaken Hamas’ command structure and missile stockpile, and to prepare for invasion. The long-term goal, on the other hand, is to take the life of Hamas’s leadership, remove the government in the Gaza Strip and significantly reduce Hamas’s military capabilities. Hamas, for its part, has set itself up for a long conflict, which means that they have to ration their rocket inventory and other resources. As before, the IDF will take the time they need before entering the Gaza Strip. In the past, the preparation phase has lasted 1–2 weeks. The advance will be slow, to avoid own losses to the greatest extent possible. The hostages in Hamas’ captivity probably change little, as long as the hostage locations are not known. Partial or full control of Gaza? A main question is whether the IDF will this time stop at a point on the Gaza Strip, or whether they will take ground control of the entire strip. The latter cannot be ruled out when looking at the IDF’s mobilization, rhetoric and strategic goals. The question then becomes how Israel will adjust in the long run. The creation of different zones or some form of security zone may be more difficult in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank and, as seen in South Lebanon, respectively, but it cannot be ruled out either. The operational target achievement will also affect this. Israel has legitimacy with its main allies for the war against Hamas, including an invasion. The legitimacy Hamas has tried to establish in and outside the region with the adjustment of its charter in 2017 and propaganda in general, they themselves shot to shreds when they carried out the worst terrorist attack of all time against Israel. Biden has declared unlimited military support. The United States and Britain have also moved naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean, as a signal to Iran and others who might consider escalating the situation. At the time of writing, Hezbollah has not done more than the minimum to show support and solidarity with Hamas. They are also weakened due to the Syrian conflict. Consequently, Iran’s strategic assessments will have greater significance. The threshold for actively entering the conflict, when you see the West’s mobilisation, will however be very high. Also because Arab states in the region would like to see a weakening of the clergy in Iran. The battle for reputation will be demanding Israel’s biggest challenge going forward is not of a military nature, but the paradigm shift that will come when the bloody images from the massacre on 7 October are forgotten, and replaced by images of horrific civilian suffering in the Gaza Strip – and it is already horrific. That Hamas started this with its massacre and is responsible for the situation that has now arisen is then easy to forget, and Israel will receive criticism. A refugee corridor for Palestinian civilians out of the Gaza Strip before an invasion would have enormous humanitarian significance for innocent civilians. It will also serve Israel reputationally and militarily. Hamas knows this, and that even then they will be able to hide among civilians to a lesser extent. What is certain in any case is that Hamas has made a conscious choice to step on a mine, the trigger of which they do not control. When it will go off, it is Israel who decides.
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Hamas stands on a mine – Statement
