After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas in 2014, Ukrainian identity has strengthened among southern and eastern Ukrainians, and support for pro-Russian parties has fallen. After the 2022 invasion, the population in these areas is increasingly united against Russian warfare. Therefore, Russian propaganda about eastern and southern Ukraine’s allegedly pro-Russian character appears increasingly absurd. Especially before 2014, a significant minority in southern and eastern parts of Ukraine defined themselves as Russians, with mixed Ukrainian-Russian identity or with pro-Russian sympathies. This was due to historical factors. Eastern Ukrainian elites tried to play on the Russian language and Russian-Soviet history to divert attention away from corruption and misrule. And it was due to Russian attempts to influence Ukrainian attitudes to suit Russian interests. After Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, eastern Ukrainians’ attitudes towards Russia have changed drastically. Among southern Ukrainians and eastern Ukrainians, the proportion with a positive impression of Russia fell from around 50 percent to 1 and 4 percent, and only 10 and 16 percent of the population from these areas would cede territory in exchange for a quick peace settlement. Instead, more than 80 percent want further military resistance. When Ukrainians in the south and east are asked what kind of relationship their state should have with Russia in the future, only a minority want the countries to be “friendly countries without visa rules and customs” Also among those who define themselves as “Russian-speaking Ukrainians” and “Russian-speaking Russians” want a majority of common borders, visas and customs rules. The Ukrainian polling institute I have referred to here – KIIS – is on par with the best Norwegian polling institutes. At the same time, it is demanding to give a correct picture of a population’s attitudes in war. The proportion of participants in the opinion polls in the areas occupied after 24 February has fallen over time. People on the run may be prevented from participating, and it may be taboo to express pro-Russian views in an informational context rigged for collective resistance. These factors hardly change the main features of the findings – they are solid. But we would do well to look at other examples as well. There are a number of such examples. Early in the occupation, we saw significant anti-Russian demonstrations in Russian-occupied areas. Russia’s later attempts to institutionalize an occupation regime have met with strong resistance. Russia has struggled to get bureaucrats and workers to work effectively under Russian leadership. During the run-up to the start of the semester this autumn, parents’ enthusiasm for sending their children to Russian schools was said to have been so lukewarm that the occupation authorities allegedly offered parents money to send their children there. The Ukrainian resistance movement is strengthening, and reconnaissance of military installations and sabotage creates a demanding and uncertain situation in Russia’s rear areas. That the resistance movement has succeeded so well indicates considerable civilian support and consent. We therefore have strong indications that support for pro-Russian attitudes is now very low in southern and eastern Ukraine. Corresponding changes in attitude occurred after Russia’s aggression in 2014. In the areas closest to occupied Donbas, some were disappointed by the Ukrainian government’s efforts for them after the war started, but this hardly made them more Russian-friendly. On the contrary, a growing proportion defined themselves as Ukrainians. In occupied Donbas, support for Russia was greater, not least because of effective Russian propaganda. But – and this is absolutely central – also in occupied Donbas, a clear majority supported the return of the areas to Ukrainian control. By and large, Ukrainians throughout the country increasingly defined themselves as Ukrainian citizens after 2014. Because the proportion with a primarily Ukrainian identity was already high in western and central Ukraine before 2014, the development was most striking among residents of the south and east. The result was a more unified Ukraine, which I have previously argued is one of the main reasons for the significantly effective Ukrainian defensive war. After the 2022 invasion, we have seen a further marked strengthening of patriotic attitudes in southern and eastern Ukraine. The Russian aggression in 2022 is even more brutal than in 2014, which makes it likely that the changes in attitude will also be permanent this time. It is no longer correct to say that southern and eastern Ukraine is Russian-dominated. In fact, support for Russia here is far lower than in large European countries such as Italy, France and Germany, where a recent PEW survey showed positive attitudes towards Russia in between 14 and 16 percent of the population. We live in an age where misinformation is actively used to support a war of aggression. In that case, it is extra important to obtain correct information. It then becomes very problematic to refer to eastern Ukraine as Russian-dominated in the European and Norwegian public. Little support in the population also means that Russia’s toolbox in Ukraine is essentially limited to military power, backed up by coercive power in cities and administrative centers and a presumably quite limited number of collaborators. If -or when- the Ukrainian military forces break through Russian lines, Russian control is therefore quickly threatened. Let me exaggerate a little for the sake of illustration: behind the Russian-controlled lines there is to a large extent a Russian-controlled castle in the air. Russia’s sudden withdrawal from northern Ukraine in March showed that Russian control is fragile. We may see more examples of this in the future, if Ukrainian forces succeed in recapturing Russian-occupied areas.
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Eastern Ukraine is becoming increasingly patriotic – Statement
