Bård Ludvig Thorheim worried about the safety around gas plants – news Nordland

– Europe is caught between the war in Ukraine and the war in the Middle East, says parliamentary representative Bård Ludvig Thorheim (H). When the EU imposed sanctions on Russia and Vladimir Putin cut off gas supplies, the EU increased supplies from other countries, several of them in the Middle East. Europe still receives gas from Russia, but Putin has threatened to stop supplies altogether. Now there is also war in the Middle East, and thus even more uncertainty arises, says the Conservative politician. – This means that the gas supply to Europe is much more uncertain and vulnerable than it was before, says Thorheim. Critical: Storting representative Bård Ludvig Thorheim hopes that the authorities have taken on board the seriousness of what Norway is facing and that they have the analyzes ready. He calls for it to be communicated. Photo: Benjamin Fredriksen / news Very important for Norway Last year, Norway accounted for 20 percent of the EU’s gas imports, according to Eurostat. The gas supply from Norway with its 9,000 kilometers of gas pipelines has become critically important for Europe, according to Thorheim. A year ago, researcher Geir Hågen Karlsen at the Norwegian Defense Academy warned that Norwegian gas is probably one of the biggest sabotage targets in Europe. – If Europe should not receive gas from the Middle East and the gas pipelines from Norway are damaged, the EU could end up in a situation where they either have to cut energy to industry and business or to households. Then lives can be lost, Thorheim points out. If industry and business in the EU end up in a situation where they have to shut down, there could be consequences for Norway as well. The threat to Norwegian infrastructure has become much greater because it plays such an important role for the rest of Europe, believes the Storting politician. – The consequences will be enormous. We must realize how important it is to protect the energy supply to Europe, says Thorheim. – Norway must do more One year ago, Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, the gas pipelines from Russia to Europe, were sabotaged. Recently, there was extensive damage to the Balticconnector. The gas pipeline that connects the Finnish gas network with the gas network in the Baltic countries. The investigation into the sabotage on Nord Stream 1 and 2 in the autumn of 2022 is nearing completion. A conclusion is expected during 2023. Photo: AP The authorities in Finland believe that a Chinese/Russian ship dragged the anchor on the seabed. Thorheim calls for the Norwegian authorities to tell what is being done to ensure the safety and preparedness of Norwegian infrastructure. Here, the EU gets its energy from the EU imports 55% of its total energy needs. Central sources of energy for the EU, where for example Algeria and Azerbaijan represent 17% of the EU’s gas consumption: · Russia · Algeria · Turkey · Qatar · Azerbaijan · The rest comes from Norway, the UK and the USA Norwegian gas is the largest supplier and accounts for 25% of the EU’s Gasimport. Sources: Arctic Securities, IEA and Eurostat – The authorities should communicate the threat and the situation as it is. People can bear to hear that. It will give us all a stronger preparedness in the population. You have to show that this is something you prioritize. Thorheim, who himself has a background in the intelligence service, is aware that it is a demanding task to have a high level of readiness around thousands of kilometers of gas pipeline. Map of the infrastructure on the Norwegian continental shelf prepared by the Ministry of Oil and Energy. Illustration: The Ministry of Oil and Energy – There is much that can be done on the intelligence side, such as mapping which threats and which actors have the will and ability to sabotage such a system. We can have underwater drones that can monitor and ban sailing over the gas pipelines. – No indication of direct threats State Secretary Astrid Bergmål in the Oil and Energy Ministry tells news that there are no indications that there are any direct threats aimed at Norway in particular. Nevertheless, the government has stepped up preparedness after the Ukraine war broke out. – The incidents in the Baltic Sea meant that the government decided to further strengthen preparedness related to infrastructure, land facilities and installations on the Norwegian continental shelf. State Secretary Astrid Bergmål in the Ministry of Oil and Energy Photo: Heiko Junge / NTB The armed forces also show more presence and patrols with forces on land, in the air, at sea, underwater and in the Cyber ​​domain, she adds. The fact that Norway cannot communicate everything that is done has a natural explanation, according to Bergmål. – The armed forces and other emergency response agencies will not go into more detail about what these measures concretely are, as precisely information about which measures have been implemented can weaken security. Read the full response from the government: State Secretary Astrid Bergmål in Oil – and the Ministry of Energy responds to this by email to news: 1: What has been done to increase preparedness around the gas pipelines on the Norwegian continental shelf? The incidents in the Baltic Sea meant that the government decided to further strengthen preparedness related to infrastructure, land facilities and installations on the Norwegian continental shelf. Not only to prevent such an incident as we saw in the Baltic Sea, but also other possible threats that could still come via the internet or in other ways. Although we have no indications that there are any direct threats aimed at Norway in particular, the government has stepped up preparedness after the war broke out. The defense also shows more presence and patrols with forces on, for example, land, in the air, at sea (for example coast guard ships), underwater and in the cyber domain. The armed forces and other emergency response agencies will not go into more detail about what these measures actually are, as precisely information about which measures have been implemented could weaken security. 2: What was done after the Nord Stream sabotage in the Baltic Sea in 2022? Businesses in the power supply are subject to strict sector regulations, which, among other things, require physical security, ICT security and repair readiness. The purpose of the regulations is to ensure that the power supply is maintained, and that normal supply is restored in extraordinary situations. 3: What measures/preparedness are planned for? The regulations require businesses in the power supply to have emergency plans. The emergency plans must, among other things, include preparations and measures that may need to be taken in the event of major accidents, significant damage, threat situations, rationing and other extraordinary situations that may affect the operation and safety of the power supply. This also includes recovery plans and repair readiness. This means that they must have the necessary personnel, expertise and resources to keep operations running, restore function and carry out tasks required under all extraordinary situations in a safe and efficient manner. 4: Do you consider the security situation serious? In connection with the ongoing situation, increased vigilance has been introduced around physical facilities and ICT in the power supply, with a low threshold for notifying the authorities. The businesses have also been asked to review their emergency plans. NVE is the emergency response authority, and reports that businesses in the power supply are taking the situation very seriously. 5: Shouldn’t Norway be looking for more gas fields? We shall further develop, not discontinue, the petroleum activities on the Norwegian continental shelf. We must continue to be a stable and long-term supplier of energy to Europe, and then we must still look for more oil and gas. This is particularly important in today’s security policy situation. At the same time, we want to develop new technologies and solutions that enable us to both cut emissions in Norway and contribute to reducing emissions elsewhere in the world. No guarantees against attacks Lieutenant-Colonel Geir Hågen Karlsen at the Norwegian Defense College gives the government the right to say that much has been done in the aftermath of the Nord Stream sabotage. But that you can never make guarantees that there will not be an attack on Norwegian infrastructure. Geir Hågen Karlsen tells news that Norway will not accept an attack on important infrastructure and that the Norwegian Armed Forces are ready to react if something were to happen. Photo: Even Bjøringsøy Johnsen / news – In addition to the war in Ukraine, preparedness around energy supply is our most important priority, he says to news. And adds: – The West is not going to accept that such important infrastructure should be exposed to attacks, whether it is sabotage or cyber attacks. – We are able to react with everything from political instruments, financial, legal, cyber or military. That includes supporting Ukraine with weapons of greater capacity or longer range than today, Karlsen points out. There are very large sea areas to be covered as well as nearly 9,000 kilometers of gas pipelines. But the lieutenant colonel has faith that we have enough preparedness in Norway. – You never have any guarantees, but I believe that the sum of deterrence, greater vigilance and a greater risk of detection will probably be sufficient. The Home Guard stands guard at Equinor’s gas plant on Kårstø. Photo: Marthe Synnøve Susort Johannessen / news



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