Can Europe agree on a common middle ground between Chinese and American interests? This autumn has been high season for major political meetings, and China’s president and party leader Xi Jinping has started traveling again. In December he was in Saudi Arabia and met the leaders of states in the Arab world. Earlier this autumn, he visited countries in Central Asia and South-East Asia. Xi did not add this autumn’s trips to any European countries, or any NATO country, for that matter. Although many met Xi during the meeting of the group of the largest economies, the G20, in Bali in November, several European leaders chose to make the trip to Beijing themselves. Many years of strong growth have made China a global power and an economic superpower. As the market and purchasing power of the country with the largest population and the second largest economy continues to grow, it has enormous attraction for states and companies that want to do business. At the same time, China’s economic muscle is so great that it can influence the conditions for how many goods are developed, produced and sold in the international market. Where some see opportunities, others see risks. It is particularly in the relations between China and the USA that many years of close economic trade are now marked by greater distance and rivalry. It is often as much about security and technological, military and political development as it is about pure economic competition. The tone between China and European countries is less tense, but both in the EU and Norway we see a shift towards more conflicts and new restrictions on cooperation with Chinese actors. In recent years, the EU has taken many measures to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen itself in the competition with China. Norway – where the government has said it is following a European line in its China policy – is following suit. We see it in the form of “screening” mechanisms for foreign investments, common standards for security assessments, transparency laws with requirements for transparent value chains, sanctions against gross human rights violations, stricter rules for export control and new guidelines for research collaboration. At the same time that the EU has created many joint arrangements, the European powers differ in their views on how to balance cooperation, competition and rivalry in their relations with China. Many in Europe are skeptical of American attempts to decouple Chinese companies from value chains in the international economy. Several people reacted when the US introduced new laws this autumn which strengthen US control over the trade in computer chips, and which offer subsidies to US companies. Europeans fear that they will lose both customers and competitiveness. In many European countries, the conflicts of interest are brought to the fore because it is China, and not the United States, that is the largest trading partner. It should therefore come as no surprise that it is Germany, Europe’s largest economy, that has triggered the strongest China debates in the EU this autumn. In November, Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz triumphed through a visit to Beijing, accompanied by the country’s top business leaders. Ahead of the visit, his government approved the sale of a quarter of the Port of Hamburg to Chinese buyers. In autumn, the German government has also brought up again the question of whether Chinese companies can still remain major suppliers of 5G network equipment, something leaders in both the EU and NATO have warned against. In December, Scholz followed up with a longer article in the magazine “Foreign Affairs”, where he warns against isolating China and dividing the world into blocs. In December, one of the EU’s top leaders, Charles Michel, the president of the European Council, made the trip to Beijing. After his meeting with Xi, Michel spoke about the value of talking together. About the war in Ukraine, where the EU is calling for Chinese support for criticism and pressure against Russia, and about cooperation issues such as climate and health. Michel also listed a battery of conflict issues, from disagreements over trade and market access, to issues over Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the South China Sea and Taiwan. After Germany went it alone a few weeks earlier, it was important for Michel to remind that the EU actually has a common China policy. The next man in the line of European top leaders on a trip to Beijing will probably be the President of France, Emmanuel Macron. He has indicated a visit in early 2023. Macron has long been keen for a more common European China policy and was clearly irritated when Scholz took a “Germany first” to Beijing in November. Ahead of Macron’s planned visit, he is expected to discuss with EU colleagues and point towards a common middle ground on the China issue. A more united front will strengthen European countries, including Norway, their negotiating cards in the face of both demanding Chinese and demanding Americans. Most European leaders therefore want common lines in China policy. However, strong national interests mean that we have to settle for more European fiddling about where those lines should actually go.
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Are we finding a middle ground for China? – Speech
