One man sits alone on the dock in the trial after the “Helge Ingstad” accident. The prosecutor believes that the collision occurred because the commander of the watch on the frigate was negligent. The warden himself says that there is much he could have done differently. But the collision could also have been avoided if others involved had done what they were supposed to, he believes. That includes those piloting the tanker that the frigate collided with. Until now, the public has been told few details about what happened on the bridge of the tanker “Sola TS”. Believes radar use was bad news has been given access to the 42-page long report, which has so far been exempt from public disclosure. It reveals new details. DEPARTURE: “Sola TS” announced departure from Stureterminalen 03.44.54. Photo: Norwegian Accident Investigation Board / Illustration In the report, the Norwegian Navy points to a number of errors they believe occurred on the tanker: They did not use radar in the correct way, either before or after departure from the Sture terminal. The use was not in line with the Maritime Rules. A lookout was not held in line with either the Maritime Rules or the ship’s own guidelines. The distribution of responsibility on the bridge was poor, which gave a poor understanding of the situation. Communication with others was poor. In front of Fedje VTS, the bridge did not give the impression that a critical situation was imminent. In front of “Helge Ingstad”, they did not give themselves a clear answer, and they should have realized that the frigate did not understand that they were talking to a tanker. The Norwegian Navy believes that “Sola TS” broke at least twelve points in the rules of the sea. The defense attorney for the accused warden believes that the report is absolutely central to the trial. He believes that the report shows that the accused duty manager’s contribution to the accident is small. The conclusion of the Norwegian Navy’s report on “Sola TS”‘s logbook The Norwegian Navy believes that “Sola TS” violates at least twelve rules of the sea. The Maritime Rules are 41 international rules that exist to prevent collisions at sea. The Norwegian Navy believes that the analysis of VDR data (voyage data recording) shows that there are grounds for claiming: Radar was not used correctly or in line with the Maritime Rules. This applies both to long-distance searches and target plotting (target tracking). Lookouts were not held in accordance with neither the Maritime Rules nor the shipping company’s bridge manual. AIS contacts were only shown on ECDIS 1 and ECDIS 2 and not radars as IMO recommendations are based. Deficient MPX as well as deficient/absent explicit division of responsibilities and roles in the bridge team contributed, together with differences in settings on ECDIS and radars, to a deficient and fragmented understanding of the situation on the Sola TS. Anti-collision was based on visual observations of other traffic supported by trails. Differences in radar settings contributed to and reinforced fragmented situational awareness. Fragmented understanding of the situation, unclear command conditions and inadequate use of radar led to HING being discovered relatively late. Both the further actions and the absence of actions show that Sola TS was not aware of the seriousness of the situation until further time had passed. Failure to use radars meant that the short-term observation of both side lanterns for HING may have been perceived as a marked maneuver to show intention (HING turns to starboard). In reality, this is due to both vessels coming slightly to starboard at the same time, and the aspect angle was consequently changed. If the Sola TS had targeted HING on one of the radars, this could have prevented this misunderstanding and led to the collision being averted. The bridge team on the Sola TS was apparently not aware that the forward deck lighting greatly reduced the visibility of the side lanterns and ALDIS lamp. One risk-reducing measure in this regard will be to target all radar echoes, as it must be assumed that their actions may deviate from what was expected because they do not see the lanterns of Sola TS. In communication with Fedje VTS over VHF, nothing appears from Sola TS’s side that gives the impression that there is a critical situation under way. Furthermore, Sola TS never unequivocally acknowledges itself to HING later in the course of events, not even when it should be obvious that HING does not agree with which vessel they are talking to. Of the maritime rules that can be used as a basis for the various actions and situations described, the following are highlighted (non-exhaustive list): # 2 (responsibility) # 4 (use # 5 (lookout) # 6 (safe speed) # 7 (danger of collision) # 8 (maneuver to avoid collision) # 14 (opposite courses) # 15 (crossing courses) # 16 (Vessel to keep off course) # 17 (vessel to maintain course and speed) # 18 (responsibility between vessels) # 20 (use (of lanterns and signal figures)).Heard “roars of frustration” from the pilot The report is an analysis of data from the voyage data recorder of the “Sola TS”. This is called VDR data (voyage data recorder) and can be compared to the black boxes of an aircraft. The analysis maps what happened from 02.29.28 until 04.59.51. The ship’s clock on “Sola TS” showed 04.01.15 when the collision occurred. One of the findings is that “Sola TS” does not look at the radar with a large section before they go out of Stureterminalen. The report author believes that this means that “Sola TS” is not informed well enough about traffic one in the area. Nor when the ship departs from the Sture terminal does the tanker use radar to orientate itself on the traffic to the south in the Hjeltefjorden. Instead, the radar focuses on the three ships sailing north, the same way “Sola TS” is going. Eleven minutes before the accident, “Helge Ingstad” is visible on the radar of “Sola TS”. It then takes seven minutes before “Sola TS” becomes aware of “Helge Ingstad”, as the pilot sees the lanterns on the frigate with his own eyes. This is one of the reasons why the Norwegian Navy believes that the use of radar was deficient. The report reveals new details about the communications between the captain, chief mate and pilot on board the tanker. Among other things, they discuss the distribution of responsibility, three minutes before the collision. It also shows that the pilot roared 49 seconds before the accident, seven seconds after the last call to “Helge Ingstad” to turn away. The report author perceives it as a roar of frustration. COLLISION: The ship’s clock on “Sola TS” shows 04.01.16 when the ship collides with “Helge Ingstad”. Photo: Sola TS/National Accident Investigation Board Report author to testify The Norwegian Navy emphasizes that the report was made on behalf of the Ministry of Defense in connection with the legal proceedings against the shipping company of “Sola TS”. – The navy has only concentrated on investigating and improving the safety of its own vessels and its own organisation. We have supported the Accident Investigation Board and carried out our own thorough investigations into what went wrong on our side and have been open about this. We have then targeted the work to strengthen security in the Norwegian Navy, says spokesman for the Norwegian Navy, Michel Hayes, to news. The report was written by naval captain Stein Egil Iversen at the Norwegian Navy’s navigation competence centre, which is the Norwegian Navy’s foremost expertise in navigation at sea. In the introduction, Iversen writes that the report can appear to be very one-sided, since it only examines “Sola TS’s” logbook. The report must be read in conjunction with their own report on the mistakes that were made on board “Helge Ingstad”, the report states. Iversen himself will testify in the trial. The public prosecutor: – A party submission The report is briefly referred to in the ongoing trial, but not properly presented to the court. State prosecutor Benedikte Høgseth tells news that she will not comment on the report in its entirety until it becomes the subject of the trial. – The report is a party submission in the civil case, prepared by the Norwegian Defense Forces and sent to the Government Attorney on that occasion. That background is important to have with you, and we will have an opinion on how this report should be emphasized when it is presented in court. Before that, it is not natural to comment further on the report, she says. The report is addressed to the Attorney General. The civil case ended in a settlement between the state and the tanker shipping company Twitt Navigation. The shipping company paid NOK 235 million to the state after the incident. “Helge Ingstad” cost NOK 4.3 billion, while the attempt to salvage the frigate cost NOK 726 million. The sum the state received from the tanker company thus amounted to less than 5 percent of what the state lost. – Previous investigations speak for themselves news has been in contact with the spokesperson for Twitt Navigation, which is the shipping company that owns “Sola TS”. They are presented with the main features of the report. – The findings in previous investigations and court decisions that have been handed down speak for themselves, and require no further comments from Twitt Navigation, writes spokesperson Pat Adamson in an email to news. ACCIDENT: “Helge Ingstad” was pushed ashore and was a total wreck. In the end it was chopped up. Photo: Cornelius Poppe / NTB Director of Department Dag Liseth in the National Accident Investigation Board’s maritime department has been asked to comment on the accusation from the Norwegian Navy that their report contains deficiencies. – I do not know the details of the report you refer to. The Accident Investigation Board carries out safety investigations and does not take a position on either civil or criminal liability in the case. It may well be that we want a different focus than what others who have to deal with want. We have nothing to do with what is being dealt with in court now. We handed in our reports in 2019 and 2021, and have nothing to comment on beyond that, he says to news. Defendant: Shows that the duty manager’s contribution to the collision is small Christian Lundin defends the accused duty manager. He tells news that the information in the report is very important for the trial. – The reason why it is important is that the report shows that the defendant’s contribution to the accident occurring is small, and that the duty manager cannot be blamed, he says. DEFENDERS: Christian Lundin and Tom Sørum are defending the accused warden. Photo: Marit Hommedal / NTB He highlights that the report claims that “Sola TS” did not orientate itself on what was from other traffic, was not clear in the messages and did not understand that they were on a course that was directly on a collision course with the frigate. – “Sola TS” is an important contribution to the accident occurring. There are many things they can be criticized for, he says.
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Points to several errors on “Sola TS” – news Vestland
